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Abstract:  
Drastic difference in the COVID-19 infection and fatality counts, observed between Hubei (Wuhan) and 
other Mainland China provinces raised public controversies. To address if these data can be consistently 
understood, we develop a model that takes into account all main qualitative features of the infection 
progression under suppression measures, while remaining simple enough to estimate the key dynamics 
parameters. We find that social distancing measures had a large effect in provinces, where moreover higher 
transmissibility appears to have triggered more effective protection. Hubei is, however, a far outlier with 
significantly larger transmissibility, but lower protection. Predicted infection attack rate is significantly 
higher for Hubei, but much lower than necessary for herd immunity. Case Fatality Rate is five times larger 
in Hubei, but our estimated Infection Fatality Rates are much more uniform/consistent across all provinces. 
Therefore, interplay of transmissibility, effective protection, and detection efficiency differences may 
explain apparently drastic count discrepancies.  
Introduction 
On January 31st The World Health Organization (WHO) classified COVID-19 outbreak as the Public Health 
Emergency of International concern (1), due to the epidemics in People Republic of China (PRC) that 
originated in Wuhan (Hubei province) (2) . WHO classified the infection spread as a pandemic (3) on March 
11th, which followed large secondary outbreaks in Europe, while later US became a new hotspot (4). The 
imposed restrictions in different countries ranged from mild to severe, with a significant impact on people’s 
lives, and likely notable future economic consequences (3, 5). After unprecedented containment and 
infection suppression measures, PRC announced the end of the epidemics on March 29th (6). 
Progression of the infection in PRC seems highly intriguing, as Hubei (with only 4% of PRC population) 
shows an order of magnitude larger number of confirmed infection cases (Fig. 1A), and two order of 
magnitude higher fatalities (Fig. 1B) compared to the total sum in all other Mainland China provinces. The 
epidemics was unfolding well before the Wuhan/Hubei closure (with the reported symptom onset of the 
first patient on December 1st 2019), and within the period of huge population movement, which started two 
weeks before January 25th (the Chinese Lunar New Year) (7). As a rough baseline, a modeling study (8) 
based on the Wuhan infection dynamics, estimated as many as 150,000 confirmed cases per day in 
Chongqing alone (due to its large population coupled with intense travel volume with Wuhan) – instead, 
the actual (reported) peak number for all Mainland China outside Hubei was just 831.  
Magnitude of the subsequent outbursts in Europe and USA is comparably even more surprising. For 
example, Ireland, with the population size of 4.9 million (two orders of magnitude smaller than PRC 
population), as of May 15th has almost two times more confirmed infection cases than all Mainland China 
except Hubei (~24.000 compared to ~13.000) and more than order of magnitude larger number of fatalities 
(1.506 compared to 116). Such extreme disproportions have created a public media controversy (9-10), 
where e.g., “The New York Times” reported that the Central Intelligence Agency has been warning the 
USA administration that China is underreporting their coronavirus cases (11). A political controversy also 
unfolded, where similar concerns have been publicly expressed by the highest ranking USA, France and 
UK officials (12). 
These allegations were strongly denied by PRC: On May 9th, Chinese Foreign Ministry published a response 
(13) to different (PRC related) COVID-19 controversies, where points 11 and 12 address allegations that 
China underreported confirmed case and fatality numbers. The rebuttal quoted a study (14), which 
concluded that China COVID-19 numbers are in accordance with Banford’s law. Two additional papers 
(15-16) are also quoted: The first paper shows a good correlation between the case counts in provinces 
outside Hubei, and outbound Wuhan mobility (tracked through mobile phones) (15) – the correlations are 
however scale invariant, so this also does not explain the drastic case and fatality count differences after 
January 23rd in Fig. 1. These two studies also show that Wuhan quarantine set much lower initial conditions 
(number of detected cases and fatalities on January 23rd) for the infected in other provinces, which is 
intuitively plausible. However, these initial conditions were still about the same for Hubei and all other 
provinces (see Fig. 1), while the subsequent (after January 23rd) time evolutions are drastically different. 
 
Figure 1: Infection and fatality counts for Hubei vs. all other provinces. Number of A) Confirmed 
infections, B) Fatality cases. Zero on the horizontal axis corresponds to the time from which the data 
are taken (January 23rd), which also coincides with the Wuhan closure. Red circles correspond to the 
observed Hubei counts. Blue squares correspond to the sum of the number of counts for all other 
provinces. The figure illustrates a puzzling difference in the number of counts between Hubei alone, 
and the sum of all other mainland China provinces. 
In this study we analyze the puzzling differences in dynamics trajectories in Mainland China provinces, 
which may put strong constraints on the underlying infection progression parameters:  
1. What interplay between the transmissibility and the suppression measure effects is responsible for 
the large difference in the count numbers between Hubei and the rest of PRC?  
2. What is the Infected Fatality Rate (IFR, the number of fatalities per infected persons) in PRC? Case 
Fatality Rate (CFR, the number of fatalities per detected cases) can be obtained directly from the 
data, but is highly sensitive to the testing capacity (larger testing coverage leads to lower CFR). 
IFR is a more fundamental mortality parameter, as it does not depend on the testing coverage, but 
is however much harder to determine, due to the unknown number of infected cases. 
3. What is the infection attack rate (AR), i.e. a fraction of population that got infected (and presumably 
became resistant afterwards), in Hubei and other provinces? Estimating AR allows understanding 
risks that the epidemic will reinitiate. As this study is completed, PRC announced that they will 
assess AR in Wuhan through serology tests on almost entire Wuhan population (17), which will 
allow a direct comparison with our predictions.  
Addressing these questions allows understanding of both different response policies, and inherent risks 
posed by the pandemics, and will enable future cross-country comparisons. 
Model and parameter inference 
We developed a model that takes into account all main qualitative features of the infection progression 
under suppression measures. The model however remains simple enough to estimate the key dynamics 
parameters, individually for each of the provinces. We opt for a deterministic model, as parameter inference 
(the central issue of our work) from stochastic models (18-19) is still an open problem (20). The relevant 
case counts are also well in a commonly considered deterministic range (>~10), while the transmission 
process is not strongly non-linear (see below) – for a linear system, mean of the stochastic trajectories 
corresponds to the deterministic solution (21).  
Classical SIR or SEIR models (or their modifications) were up to now used to predict or explain different 
features of COVID-19 infection dynamics (16, 22-23). SIR-based models may be used to estimate some 
aspects of the infection dynamics, but they cannot be used to more realistically infer the infection 
parameters, due to a large number of latent (exposed) individuals, which (due to latency period) show 
different dynamics compared to the infected population. We thus modify SEIR model, to take into account 
social distancing (lockdowns, school and university closures, infection induced behavioral changes), 
consistent with drastic non-pharmaceutical interventions applied in PRC. Quarantine by detecting (and 
subsequently containing) some fraction of the infected is also explicitly taken into account, which accounts 
for (presumably) large number of the infected that are not detected (5): 
/ /dS dt I S N S                (1) 
/ /dE dt I S N E                (2) 
/dI dt E I I                   (3) 
/dD dt I h D m D                 (4) 
/dH dt h D             (5) 
/dF dt m D             (6) 
In the above equations S, E, I, D, H, F, N are, respectively: susceptible, exposed, infected, active detected, 
healed (recovered), fatalities and the total population number. The parameter notation is the following: β - 
the infection rate in a fully susceptible population; α - the protection rate, i.e., the rate with which the 
population moves from susceptible to protected category, quantifying the impact of the social protection 
measures. The protection rate α is taken as 0 before t0 (the onset of social measures), and constant 
afterwards; σ - inverse of the latency period; γ - inverse of the infectious period; δ - inverse of the period of 
the infected detection/diagnosis; ε - the detection efficiency quantifying the fraction of diagnosed infected 
population; h - the recovery rate; m - the mortality rate. 
In Eq. (1), the susceptible pool is depleted due to both the infection process, and the social distancing 
measures - moving the susceptible to the protected compartment. Alternatively, a frequently used approach 
is to account for interventions by modifying β in some assumed form (e.g., with step-wise constant (16) or 
exponential dependence (24)), through which a phenomenological law is however introduced in otherwise 
mechanistic (SIR or SEIR) model. We instead introduced social distancing consistent with the SEIR 
compartmental structure, so that susceptible move to the protected category with rate α. The nonlinearity 
appears only through the “infection” (β·S·I)/N term, so the system is not strongly non-linear (see above). In 
Eq. (2), the latent population increases due to the infection events, and decreases due to a delayed transition 
to the infected with rate σ. In Eq. (3), the infected population is increased due to this transition, removed 
with rate γ, or detected (and isolated/quarantined) with rate ε·δ. Eq. (4) describes the dynamics of active 
detected cases, which increase due to detection of the infected, or decrease due to the recovery or fatalities. 
Eqs. (5) and (6) follow directly from Eq. (4). Note that the dynamics of the protected dP/dt = αS, and the 
resistant dR/dt = γI compartments is not explicitly included in Eqs. (1) - (6), as it does not impact the 
observable quantities (D, H, F). The corresponding conservation law is S+E+I+D+H+F+P+R=N. 
The main difficulty in parameter inference is that healing and mortality rates (h and m) are time-dependent, 
i.e. they, respectively, significantly increase and decrease with time – this can be directly obtained from 
Eqs. (5) and (6). Consequently, instead of the active detected cases D (which depend on time-dependent h 
and m rates), we propose as the main observable the total number of detected cases 
tD D H F   , i.e. the 
sum of active cases, recovered cases and fatalities: 
tdD I
dt
    ,           (7) 
where this equation substitutes Eqs. (4) - (6), conveniently removing the rates h and m from our analysis. 
We further denote our model as εα-SEIR, where εα denotes that it takes into account not only the basic 
(unsuppressed) infection dynamics, but also the effective social distancing (through α) and joint 
quarantine/sampling processes (through ε), which also sets the scale between the “iceberg” (latent and 
infected) and its “tip” (detected) – with the translocated tip, due to inherent delays in the model (e.g., latency 
period). 
For parameter estimation, Eq. (3) allows separating the social distancing measures (-α·S term in Eq. (1)) 
from sampling the infected to the protected compartment (ε·δ·I in Eq. (4)), through the resulting basic 
reproduction rate R0,free = β/(γ+ε·δ). Notation R0, free is in accordance with (22) (a SIR-based study taking 
into account social distancing measures), and a definition where R0 corresponds to completely susceptible 
population in the absence of social distancing measures (in a completely naive population) (25-26). R0,e 
from (22) can be recovered following (24),    0,e
0
expR S t N t dt 

  , under assumptions of 
sufficiently strong α and small t0 (immediately effective measures), so that from Eq. (1) S (t) ~ exp (αt). 
R0,e corresponds to another definition of R0, which does not require the absence of social distancing 
measures (i.e. only non-resistant population). The discussion above explains the empirical observation that 
R0 for PRC reported in the literature shows much variation, from 1.4 (27) to recently reported 5.7 (28), as 
it is not only model (see the integral above), but also definition-dependent. We further adopt R0 ≡ R0,free, in 
line with the goal of our work, as it allows separating the transmissibility influenced by biological, climate 
and sociodemographic qualities (R0) from interventions increasing social distancing (quantified by α and 
t0). In addition to R0, α and t0, two initial conditions (I0 and E0), and the detection efficiency ε, are unknown 
and may differ between the provinces. σ and γ characterize the fundamental infection processes, not 
expected to change from one province to another, and have consistent mean values between independent 
studies (γ = 0.4 days-1, σ = 0.2 days-1) (18, 29).  
εα-SEIR was numerically solved by Runge-Kutta method (30) for each parameter combinations. Parameter 
values were inferred by exhaustive search over a wide parameter range, to avoid reaching local minimum 
of the objective function (R2). To infer the unknown parameters, we fit (by minimizing R2) εα-SEIR to the 
observed total number of detected Dt for each province. How different properties of Dt curve determine the 
unknown parameters? Early in the infection, almost the entire population is susceptible (S≈N), so Eqs. (2) 
and (3) become linear, and decoupled from the rest of the system. This sets the ratio of I0 to E0, through the 
eigenvector components with the positive eigenvalues of the Jacobian. Similarly, β is set by the initial slope 
of log(Dt) curve. From Eq. (7) one can see that the product of I0 and ε·δ is set by tdD dt  at the initial time 
(t=0). Later dynamics of the Dt curve is determined by the combination tα = t0 + 1/α (which we denote as 
protection time), setting the time at which ~1/2 of the population moves to the protected category. We also 
numerically checked this, i.e. t0 can be lowered at the expense of increasing 1/α, without affecting the fit 
quality. Two independent parameters (I0 and tα) have to be determined from the late infection dynamics. As 
social distancing depletes S, Dt curve grows subexponentially, which may be quantified 
phenomenologically, e.g., through generalized-growth model, and the related growth parameter (24), which 
sets tα. Dt curve saturates when the infected are depleted, so the saturation time depends on the scale (height) 
of the infected curve, which sets I0, 
Over-fitting is consequently not expected, as the same number of characteristic dynamics features is at least 
equal to the number of fit parameters. The late dynamics may however be less sensitive to I0 then to tα 
(which directly relates to the dominant subexponential growth of Dt curve). We observed this numerically, 
where I0 can sometimes be decreased compared to the best fit value, without noticeably affecting the fit 
quality. We therefore checked this specifically for each province, and where possible (few provinces), we 
chose the lowest I0 value that still leads to a comparably good fit. This allows us to obtain the most 
conservative (i.e., as high as consistent with the data) IFR estimate, as the reported number of fatalities for 
all PRC provinces (except Hubei) is surprisingly low.  
Errors for the inferred parameters were estimated through Monte-Carlo simulations (31), individually for 
each province with assumption that count numbers follow Poisson distribution. Monte-Carlo simulations 
were found as the only reliable estimate of the fit parameter uncertainties for non-linear fit (32), where in 
our case a closed form expression is moreover not available. P values related with comparison of the 
calculated/reported quantities are estimated by t-test. 
Results 
We used εα-SEIR with the parameter inference described above, to analyze all Mainland China provinces, 
with the exception of Tibet, where Dt counts have been very low (below 17). Parameters were estimated 
separately for each of the 30 provinces. In Fig. 2A and B, we show that our model can robustly explain the 
observed Dt, in the cases of large outburst (Hubei on Fig. 2A), as well as for all other provinces, where Dt 
is in the range from intermediate (e.g., Guangdong) to low (e.g., Inner Mongolia). Provinces in Fig. 2B 
were selected to cover the entire range of observed Dt (from lower to higher counts), while equally good 
fits were obtained for all other provinces, which were all included in the further analysis. Our method is 
also robust with respect to data perturbations (which might be frequent), e.g., in the case of Hubei (Wuhan), 
a large number of counts was added on Feb. 12th, based on clinical diagnosis (CT scan) (2), which is 
apparent as a discontinuity in observed Dt in Fig. 2A. The model however interpolates this discontinuity, 
finding a reasonable description of the overall data. 
 
Figure 2: Model predictions: comparison with data and key parameter estimates. Predictions 
(compared to data) of confirmed infection counts and for A) Hubei, B) other Mainland China provinces. 
The observed counts are shown by dots, and our model predictions by dashed curves. Names of the 
provinces are indicated in the legend, with provinces selected to cover the full range of the observed 
total detected counts. The distribution with respect to provinces of C) the basic reproduction number R0, 
D) the protection time tα. E) Case Fatality Rate - proportion of fatalities out of total detected cases. F) 
Infected Fatality Rate - fatalities per total infected. The values for Hubei are indicated by the red bars.  
We back propagated the dynamics inferred for Hubei, to estimate that January 5th (±4 days) was the onset 
of the infection exponential growth in the population (not to be confused with the appearance of first 
infections, which likely happened in December (2)). This agrees well with (2) (cf. Fig. 3A), which tracked 
cases according to their symptom onset (shifted for ~12 days with respect to detection/diagnosis, cf. Fig. 
3B), and coincides with WHO reports on social media that there is a cluster of pneumonia cases – with no 
deaths – in Wuhan (33). Since our analysis does not directly use any information prior to January 23rd, this 
agreement provides confidence in our I0 (see above) estimate, on which depend our estimates of IFR and 
AFR below.  
Key parameters inferred from our analysis are summarized in Fig. 2C-F, with individual results and errors 
for all the provinces shown in Supplement. Fig. 2C shows the distribution of transmissibility R0. Note that 
R0 might depend on demographic (population density, etc.) and climate factors (temperature, humidity…), 
which are not controllable, but is unrelated to the applied social distancing measures, which are prone to 
intervention (see the discussion on above). Obtained average R0 for provinces outside of Hubei is 5.3±0.3, 
in a reasonable agreement with a recent estimate (≈5.7). Furthermore, we observe that R0 for Hubei is a far 
outlier with R0 value of 8.2±0.4, which is notably larger than for other provinces with p~10
-11. This then 
strongly suggests that demographic and climate factors that determine R0, played a decisive role in a large 
outburst in Hubei vs. other provinces, which we further address below. 
Distribution of protection time tα for the provinces is shown in Fig. 2D, with the value for Hubei indicated 
in red. The mean for other provinces is 6.6±0.2 days. That is, we observe that the suppression measures 
were efficiently implemented, with ~½ of the population moving to the protected category within a week 
from Wuhan closure. The protection time for Hubei of 8.3±0.2 days was noticeably longer, which is 
statistically significant at p~10-11 level. The estimated less efficient protection in the case of Hubei may also 
be an important contributing factor in the surprising difference in Hubei vs. other provinces, which we 
further investigate below. 
CFR distribution, based on the fatality numbers reported for Hubei and other provinces is shown in Fig. 
2E. These numbers are not based on the model predictions, i.e. can be straightforwardly obtained by 
dividing the total number of fatalities with the total number of detected cases. CFR for other provinces with 
a mean of 1.2±0.4%, is significantly smaller compared to CFR for Hubei, which was 4.6% before the 
correction on April 17th, and 6.5% after the correction (with 1290 fatalities added to Wuhan). This drastic 
difference in CFR between Hubei and other provinces further accentuates the differences noted in Fig. 1. 
IFR distribution, which provides a much less biased measure of the infection mortality, is shown in Fig. 2F. 
In distinction to CFR, estimated IFR shows a much smaller difference between Hubei (0.15%±0.09%) and 
other provinces (0.056±0.007%). Therefore, while Hubei is a clear outlier with respect to CFR, we observe 
similar IFR values for all PRC provinces, where few provinces have even higher IFR than Hubei. The ratio 
of IFR to CFR equals the fraction of all infected that got detected (detection coverage). We estimate that 
the mean detection coverage for all provinces except Hubei is higher than detection coverage for Hubei 
(4.5±0.9% vs. 2±2%). This difference is responsible for decrease by a factor of two from CFR to IFR for 
Hubei, compared to the other provinces, and consequently for more uniform mortality estimates at IFR 
level. Xinjiang (Uyghur Autonomous Region) has the highest IFR of 0.25±0.09%, so that Hubei is not an 
outlier anymore. 
In Fig. 3A, two key infection progression parameters are plotted against each other: protection time tα vs. 
transmissibility R0. Unexpectedly, there is a high negative correlation, with Pearson correlation coefficient 
R =  0.70, which is statistically highly significant p~10-5. Note that these two are a priori unrelated as
0 0, freeR R (see above). Even for 0,eR , stronger social distancing measures would decrease it (see above), 
leading to a tendency to be positively correlated with tα, oppositely from the strong negative correlation in 
Fig. 3A. Therefore, higher transmissibility is related with a shorter protection time (larger effect of the 
suppression measures). Intuitively, this could be understood as a negative feedback loop, where larger R0 
leads to steeper initial growth in the infected numbers, but which may subsequently elicit stronger measures. 
We however see that Hubei (marked in red) is a far outlier. That is, while there is a clear tendency that 
higher R0 leads to higher suppression, Hubei is located in the upper right quadrant, characterized by both 
high transmissibility (R0) and relatively low suppression effect (high tα). 
 
 
Figure 3: Interplay of transmissibility and effective social distancing. A) The correlation plot of tα 
vs. R0 for all provinces, where the point corresponding to Hubei is marked in red. B) The effect (on the 
Hubei dynamics of infected and latent cases) of reducing R0 and tα to the mean values of other PRC 
provinces. Both the unperturbed Hubei dynamics and the sum of infected and latent cases for all other 
provinces is included as a reference.  
Two main properties of the Hubei outburst are therefore high R0 and higher tα compared to other provinces. 
In Fig. 3B, we investigate how these two properties separately affect the Wuhan outburst for latent and 
infected cases, where unperturbed Hubei dynamics is shown by the red full curve. We first reduce only R0 
from the Hubei value, to the mean value for all other provinces (the dash-dotted green curve). We see that 
reducing R0 substantially reduces the peak of the curve, though it still remains wide. Next, instead of 
decreasing R0, we decrease the protection tα to the mean value for all other provinces (dashed orange curve). 
While reducing tα also significantly lowers the peak of the curve, its main effect is in narrowing the curve, 
i.e. reducing the outburst time. Finally, when R0 and tα are jointly reduced, we obtain the (dotted purple) 
curve that is both significantly lower and narrower than the original Hubei progression. This curve comes 
quite close to the curve that presents the sum of all other provinces (full blue curve) - the dotted curve 
remains somewhat above this sum, mainly because the initial number of latent and infected cases is 
somewhat higher for Hubei compared to the sum of all other provinces. The synergy between the 
transmissibility and the suppression measures, will be further discussed below. 
Discussion and summary 
The infection progression in PRC has led to a puzzling difference in the number of counts observed between 
Hubei and other Mainland China provinces, which has in part created first public media, and then high-
level political controversy (see Introduction). On April 17th, PRC has also revised their numbers, 
substantially increasing (for ~50%) its fatality count, which our analysis takes into account. A naive 
explanation of the puzzle might be that closing Wuhan prevented the influx of the infected to other Chinese 
provinces. It was however previously shown that, at the start of the travel ban, most Chinese cities had 
already received many infected travelers (34), which is also consistent with the fact that the initial number 
of detected (and our estimates of the infected) cases, were similar in Wuhan compared to the sum in all 
other provinces. 
To resolve this puzzle, we here formulated εα-SEIR model and corresponding parameter inference 
procedure. εα-SEIR (as well as other SIR or SEIR based models) could be further extended, by including a 
larger number of compartments, e.g., to stratify population according to their demographic properties 
(which in the limit leads to individual-based models). This would enable detailed projections from the 
model, e.g., effects of preferentially protecting certain age group. However, the number of parameters 
increases as a square of the number of compartments (24), which may be a major obstacle in the context of 
parameter inference. For example, in an individual-based model, parameters were jointly fitted to fatality 
counts from 11 different countries (35), which is not feasible in our case, where parameters have to be 
estimated individually for each PRC province. Consequently, our approach is well suited for the problem 
considered, where population average parameters are to be separately estimated from individual time-series 
data.  
We here obtained that Hubei was an outlier with respect to two key infection progression parameters: having 
significantly larger R0, and a longer time needed to move a sizable fraction of the population from 
susceptible to protected category. It is interesting that the initial origin of the epidemic (Hubei) has also a 
significantly larger R0 compared to all other provinces, as in principle these two do not have to be related. 
While stricter measures were formally introduced in Hubei, the initial phase of the outburst put a large 
strain on the system, arguably leading to less effective measures compared to other provinces (13). 
The fact that the initial epidemic in Hubei was not followed by similar outbursts in the rest of PRC may be 
understood as a serendipitous interplay of the two factors noted above. While both smaller R0 and lower 
half-protection time (more efficient measures) significantly suppress the infection curve, their effect is also 
qualitatively different. While lowering R0 more significantly suppresses the peak, decreasing the half-
protection time significantly reduces the outburst duration. Consequently, the synergy of these two effects 
appears to lead to drastically suppressed infection dynamics in other Mainland China provinces compared 
to Hubei. The number of detected (diagnosed) cases in entire PRC is therefore, though unintuitive, well 
consistent with the model, and may be explained by a seemingly reasonable combination of circumstances.  
The fatality rates, however, appear to be more controversial. As a partial explanation, we here find a 
significant change in relative differences between CFR and IFR. While CFR is more than five times larger 
for Hubei, the numbers appear much more self-consistent at the level of IFR, with Hubei comparable to 
other PRC provinces. We show that this is due to smaller testing coverage in Hubei, which appears to be 
consistent with known testing capacities (10000 tests per day in Hubei, vs. 40000 tests per day in all other 
provinces with significantly smaller total infection cases), and with WHO report on contact tracing in PRC 
provinces (36). Despite that IFR appears consistent between the provinces, it does look unusual that for as 
many as 13 provinces (with otherwise huge population) there have been no reported COVID-19 fatalities. 
This suggests that a careful review (as done for Wuhan) might be needed, since some of the fatalities might 
be misclassified. However, even this is unlikely to significantly change our overall result of relatively low 
IFR coming from PRC epidemics. Ethnicity/racial factors might also contribute to low IFR in PRC, as we 
inferred the highest IFR (noticeably surpassing that of Hubei, even with the most recent revision) for 
Xinjiang province. Uyghur majority in Xinjiang have been genetically linked with mixed European/ West 
Asian (being dominant) and East Asian ancestry (37), which in that respect might better reflect mortality 
in European and US hotspots. Overall, however, our study infers that COVID-19 in PRC has been a highly 
contagious disease, with transmissibility in-between those of influenza (R0 ~ 1-2) (38) and measles (R0 ~ 
12-18) (39), and with IFR comparable to these two diseases (36, 40), but with almost completely naive 
population even after the first infection wave (see below). Consistency of these results with those in other 
countries still remains to be carefully studied and understood.  
Finally, our analysis also indicates a very low overall infection attack rate (AR). That is, we obtained that 
a fraction of PRC population that got infected (and presumably resistant), is just 5±3% for Hubei, and about 
two orders of magnitude lower for other provinces. If confirmed through serology tests (see above), the 
obtained low AR (i.e. the associated low fraction of presumably resistant population) may be concerning 
in a longer term, since what really quelled the infection was rapidly moving the population from susceptible 
to protected category through drastic social distancing measures. These measures forced the infection curve 
to an essentially unstable fixed point, as stochastic simulations showed that as few as 5 individuals are 
sufficient for the infection onset (41).  
Therefore, as the measures are abolished, and if SARS-CoV-2 inherent virulence does not weaken (by 
mutations, changing weather conditions, etc.), the infection may reinitiate. There might already be signs of 
this for China, since as of May11th new domestic clusters of COVID-19 cases were reported in Wuhan and 
Jilin province (42), where Shulan (Jilin province) declared martial law, went into lockdown, and 
temporarily shut all public places (43). There are also early indications that our estimates of low AR for 
China, may also be globally representative, e.g., based on a small scale epidemiological study, it was 
recently concluded that ~1.8 million people in Germany (~2% of the population) might have been infected 
(44). If so, and given the obtained high transmissibility of COVID-19, second wave infections might be 
expected globally, as a number of nations begin easing lockdown. 
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